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Past the Tipping Point, but With Hope
of Return: How Creating a
Geoengineering Compulsory Licensing
Scheme Can Incentivize Innovation
Brooke Wilson*
Abstract
This Note explores the patenting of geoengineering technologies
and issues arising from the early stages of this high-risk,
high-reward technology. This Note focuses on one possible solution
to solving the issues surrounding the patenting of geoengineering
technology: Creating a specialized compulsory licensing scheme.
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I. Introduction
As of February 2021, the Keutsch Research Group at Harvard
University is on track to launch one of the biggest outdoor tests of
stratospheric aerosol injection.1 The project is called Stratospheric
Controlled Perturbation Experiment (SCoPEx) and will simulate
the cloaking effect of a volcano eruption.2 A high-altitude balloon
will lift an instrument package approximately twenty kilometers
into the atmosphere and release a very small amount of material
to create a perturbed air mass roughly one kilometer long and one
1. See Jonathan Watts, US and Saudi Arabia blocking regulation of
geoengineering, sources say, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 18, 2019 2:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/mar/18/us-and-saudi-arabiablocking-regulation-of-geoengineering-sources-say (“US academics at Harvard
are also poised to conduct the biggest outdoor test of stratospheric aerosol
injection, which simulates the cloaking effect of a volcano eruption.”)
[https://perma.cc/B6RC-HDNW]; see also Keutsch Research Group, SCoPEx,
HARV. U., https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/keutschgroup/scopex (last visited Feb.
20, 2021) (describing a proposed platform test in Sweden in June 2021)
[hereinafter SCoPEx] [perma.cc/6Q8H-2XDY].
2. See Watts, supra note 1 (identifying the Harvard experiment).
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hundred meters in diameter.3 The purpose of the experiment is to
observe how particles interact with one another; to measure
changes such as aerosol density, atmospheric chemistry, and light
scattering; and to test whether it is possible to find aerosols that
can reduce or eliminate ozone loss without increasing other
physical risks.4 This project has the potential to improve
knowledge relevant to estimating the overall effectiveness and
risks of solar geoengineering.5
The Keutsch Group’s project is monumental in several ways.
A successful test could spark the development of more
geoengineering technology, large-scale schemes designed and
aimed at reducing the effects of climate change.6 Once deployed,
SCoPEx would be one of the first experiments to collect real data
and compare those results to existing computer generated models.7
If successful, SCoPEx could “create a template for how
geoengineering research is conducted going forward, and perhaps
pave the way for more experiments to follow.”8 Further, SCoPEx
illuminates that private businesses, institutions, and inventors are
driving the new wave of geoengineering and climate engineering
technology, and SCoPEx illuminates the role intellectual property
plays in developing geoengineering technology.9

3. See SCoPEx, supra note 1 (answering general questions about the
purpose and objectives of the experiment).
4. See id. (explaining the purpose and highlighting the concerns regarding
the project).
5. See id. (answering the question of whether SCoPEx will test
geoengineering itself).
6. See id. (explaining that the group hopes to learn more about
stratospheric aerosol physics and chemistry to improve large-scale models).
7. See id. (“Computer modeling and laboratory work tell us some very
useful things about solar geoengineering, but as with all other aspects of
environmental science, computer models ultimately rest on observations of the
real environment.”).
8. James Temple, Geoengineering is very controversial. How can you do
experiments? Harvard has some ideas., MIT TECH. R. (July 29, 2019),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/614025/geoengineering-experimentharvard-creates-governance-committee-climate-change/ [perma.cc/2RBN-9L27].
9. See id. (observing that there is not “any public oversight body set up to
weigh the particularly complex questions surrounding such a proposal”); see also
SCoPEx, supra note 1 (explaining how the intellectual property from the SCoPEx
project is being managed).
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Throughout history, developments in technology have been
imperative to solving societal problems.10 Today, one of the most
pressing threats to society is climate change where “the most
extreme risks of climate change can’t be ruled out—including the
collapse of human civilization.”11 Geoengineering technology
provides a possible solution to slowing and mitigating the effects
of climate change.12 With the lack of government oversight, private
actors and intellectual property will have a substantial role in the
research, development, and potential implementation of
geoengineering technologies.13 Yet, issues have developed and are
continuing to develop with patenting geoengineering (also
commonly referred to as climate-engineering) technologies.14 The
challenge becomes how to safely incentivize innovation in a field of
technology that could have profound local and global effects.
10. See e.g., Claudia Flavell-While, Fritz Haber and Carl Bosch–Feed the
World,
THE
CHEM.
ENG’R
(Mar.
1,
2010),
https://www.thechemicalengineer.com/features/cewctw-fritz-haber-and-carlbosch-feed-the-world/ (“[The Haber-Bosch process] made it possible for the first
time to produce synthetic fertilisers and produce sufficient food for the Earth’s
growing population.”) [perma.cc/5NAF-A3YM]; see also Howard Markel, The real
story
behind
penicillin,
PBS
NEWSHOUR
(Sept.
27,
2013),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/the-real-story-behind-the-worlds-firstantibiotic (“The discovery of penicillin, one of the world’s first antibiotics, marks
a true turning point in human history—when doctors finally had a tool that could
completely cure their patients of deadly infectious diseases.”) [perma.cc/UWN4KU32].
11. Katia Dmitrieva, JPMorgan Warns of Climate as a Threat to ‘Human
Life as We Know It’, BLOOMBERG GREEN (Feb. 21, 2020, 2:44 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-21/jpmorgan-warns-ofclimate-threat-to-human-life-as-we-know-it [perma.cc/WH3F-M5NL].
12. See Rima Sabina Aouf, Five Geoengineering Solutions Proposed to Fight
Climate Change, DEZEEN (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.dezeen.com/2018/10/18/fivegeoengineering-solutions-climate-change-un-ipcc-technology/
(“The
United
Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report highlighted
geoengineering as a necessary Plan B if temperature rises can’t be capped at a
manageable level.”) [perma.cc/NP8B-YZDU].
13. See Jesse L. Reynolds, Jorge L. Contreras, & Joshua D. Sarnoff,
Intellectual Property Policies for Solar Geoengineering, WILEY 1, 2,
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/wcc.512 (last updated Dec. 12,
2017) (explaining the lack of governance will lead to intellectual property and
private actors to play a growing role) [perma.cc/MS7D-J3VA].
14. See Anthony E. Chavez, Exclusive Rights to Saving the Planet: The
Patenting of Geoengineering Inventions, 13 N.W. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 9–17
(2015) (describing the development and issues of patenting geoengineering
technology).
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This Note explores one possible solution to the issues involved
in patenting geoengineering technology. Part II provides context
for the growing threat of climate change and how geoengineering
technologies are defined. Part III describes the current status of
geoengineering patents, the unique issues pertaining to patenting
Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) and Solar Radiation Management
(SRM) technology, and the recommendations that have been
previously provided in the literature. Part IV proposes an approach
to address issues with patenting geoengineering technology and
how to continue to safely promote innovation.
II. Background
A. The Growing Threat of Climate Change
Global climate change has become an increasing threat to the
United States and the world.15 In 1990, in response to President
Reagan’s proposal for a U.S. Global Change Research Program
(USGCRP), Congress passed the United States Global Change
Research Act (GCRA) with the goal of “improv[ing] understanding
of global change.”16 The federal program coordinates federal
research and invests in understanding the “forces shaping the

15. See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE
ASSESSMENT: CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (Jerry M.
Melillo et al. eds., 2014) (identifying the observed and projected climate change
impacts for specific regions across the United States) [hereinafter THIRD
NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT]; see also Climate Change, UNITED NATIONS,
https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/climate-change/ (last visited Oct. 25,
2019) (“Climate Change is the defining issue of our time and we are at a defining
moment.”) [perma.cc/S7M8-MLXN].
16. 15 U.S.C. § 2933 (2018); see John P. Holdren, Tamara Dickinson, Mike
Kuperberg, & Afua Bruce, Celebrating the 25th Anniversary of the U.S. Global
Change Research Program, THE WHITE HOUSE PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA (Nov.
16,
2015
9:50
AM),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/11/16/celebrating-25thanniversary-us-global-change-research-program (“Twenty-five years ago today,
the landmark Global Change Research Act (GCRA) was signed into law by
President George H.W. Bush, formally mandating the U.S. Global Change
Research Program (USGCRP) that had been proposed in President Reagan’s final
budget.”) [perma.cc/G9JN-R92X].
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global environment, both human and natural, and their impacts
on society.”17
In 2014, the USGCRP released the Third National Climate
Assessment: Climate Change Impacts in the United States.18 The
report illustrated that over the last fifty years, the atmospheric
concentration of heat-trapping gases, such as carbon dioxide,
methane, and nitrous oxide, has skyrocketed, resulting in an
increase in the global annual average temperature.19 Weather
patterns, incidents of extreme weather, and amount of
precipitation are predicted to change and increase.20 Along with
these physical effects, climate change will have drastic societal,
health, and economic effects, which will disproportionately affect
certain people and communities including children, the sick, the
poor, and some communities of Color.21 Particularly
climate-related hazards will exacerbate other stressors.22
In 2014, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) released the Fifth Assessment Report, which evaluated the
shifting patterns of risk and potential benefits since the last
assessment in 2007.23 The report explained that there was a very
17. About USGCRP, U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RES. GRP., GLOBALCHANGE.GOV,
https://www.globalchange.gov/about
[hereinafter
About
USGCRP]
[perma.cc/L3E7-43XW].
18. See generally THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, supra note 15
(discussing the impact and future impact climate change will have on the United
States).
19. See id. at 23 (“The majority of the warming at the global scale over the
past 50 years can only be explained by the effects of human influences . . . [t]he
emissions from human influences that are affecting the climate include heat
trapping gases . . . .”).
20. See id. at 25–49 (explaining the current and predicted consequences of
climate change including increased annual temperatures, changes in average
annual precipitation, lengthening of the frost-free season, more frequent heavy
downpours and extreme weather events, more intense and frequent hurricanes,
rising sea levels, decreased ice volume, and increases in ocean acidification).
21. See id. at 221 (explaining how climate change threatens human health
and identifying groups specifically vulnerable).
22. See Lennart Olsson, Livelihoods and Poverty, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY. PART A: GLOBAL AND SECTORAL
ASPECTS. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT
OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 796 (C.B. Field et al. eds.,
Cambridge University Press 2014) (“Climate-related hazards exacerbate other
stressors, often with negative outcomes for livelihoods, especially for people living
in poverty (high confidence).”).
23. See generally id. (summarizing the changes that have occurred since
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high likelihood, based on robust evidence and high agreement, that
“climate change and climate variability worsen existing poverty,
exacerbate inequalities, and trigger both new vulnerabilities and
some opportunities for individuals and communities.”24 While
people may have economic disadvantages due to different
circumstances and are not equally affected, “[c]limate change
interacts with non-climatic stressors and entrenched structural
inequalities to shape vulnerabilities.”25
Projections about the pattern of poverty across the globe vary
substantially.26 Yet, there has been a shift in distribution of global
poverty, which has challenged the view that the world’s poorest
people live in the poorest countries.27 These trends suggest “that
substantial pockets of poverty persist in countries with higher
levels of average per capita income.”28 Additionally since 2005,
between-country inequality has been decreasing, but
within-country inequality fluctuates based on geographic
location.29 Within-country inequality is rising in Asia, falling in
Latin America, and difficult to discern in sub-Saharan Africa.30
These two factors—poverty and persistent inequality—are the
“most salient of the conditions that shape climate-related
vulnerability.”31
When poor and marginalized people face a climate hazard,
even a modest one, they usually have the least buffer to face, the
fewest assets to liquidate in times of hardship or crisis, and suffer

2007 because of climate change).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 801 (advising caution when requiring poverty projections due
to the different means these projections use and the diverse conceptions of poverty
itself).
27. See id. (explaining the shift in global poverty toward middle income
countries and an increase in relative poverty in high income countries).
28. Id.
29. See id. at 802 (explaining the trends for between-country and
within-country inequality between 2005 and 2014).
30. See id. (“However, within-country inequality is rising in Asia, especially
[C]hina, albeit from relatively low levels, and is falling in Latin America, albeit
from very high levels, while trends in sub-Saharan Africa are difficult to discern
regionally . . . .”).
31. Id.
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the most from successive events with limited recovery time.32
Climate change, climate variability, and extreme events affect
several aspects of a person’s life.33 They can negatively affect
natural assets (such as lakes and rivers where certain livelihoods
depend directly), damage physical assets (including homes and
farms), erode financial assets (losses of farms and jobs and
increased costs of living due to expenses like funerals), result in
damage to human assets (food insecurity, undernourishment,
spikes in food prices, anxiety, depression), and erode social and
cultural assets (disrupting social networks which prevent the
mobilization of labor and reciprocal gifts).34 Overall, these can have
the effect of keeping poor people in a poverty trap.35 It is projected
that climate change will slow economic growth and poverty
reduction and create new poverty pockets between 2014 and 2100,
in developing and developed countries.36
Additionally,
developing
countries
may
experience
disproportionate and unequal impacts of climate change.37
Developing countries that have set to achieve the United Nation’s
Sustainable Development Goals, are being severely hampered by
the adverse effects of climate change.38 Statements taken from
32. See id. (“People who are poor and marginalized usually have the least
buffer to face even modest climate hazards and suffer the most from successive
events with little time for recovery.”).
33. See id. at 803 (“Climate change, climate variability, and extreme events
interact with numerous aspects of people’s livelihoods.”).
34. See id. (describing the different aspects of one’s life climate change
affects).
35. See id. at 806 (“Poverty traps arise when climate change, variability, and
extreme events keep poor people poor and make some poor even poorer.”).
36. See id. at 796–97 (describing how “[c]limate change will create new poor
between now and 2100, in developing and developed countries, and jeopardize
sustainable development”).
37. See Climate Change and the Developing World: A Disproportionate
Impact,
U.S.
GLOB.
LEADERSHIP
COAL.
(March
2020),
https://www.usglc.org/blog/climate-change-and-the-developing-world-adisproportionate-impact/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2021) (“While global leadership on
climate change will require multi-faceted policy solutions, there is consensus that
extreme weather and disruption from drought, flooding, and conflicts over natural
resources disproportionately affect the developing world, particularly the poor
and most vulnerable including women and children.”) [perma.cc/464D-HC94].
38. See Unprecedented Impacts of Climate Change Disproportionately
Burdening Developing Countries, Delegate Stresses, as Second Committee
Concludes
General
Debate,
UNITED
NATIONS
(Oct.
8,
2019),
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delegates from over a dozen countries at the United Nations’
General Assembly Second Committee meeting highlighted the vast
ways which climate change was affecting each country and the
pressing need to address these issues.39 While the issues voiced at
the assembly were tailored to each country, there was an overall
sense of urgency and hope for a unified global initiative.40
Further, there is a sense that the globe may have surpassed a
threshold for a cascade of inter-related tipping points.41 The
concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has increased
by over forty percent since 1750.42 While the planet is capable of
adapting and absorbing changes to its atmosphere, the rate at
which it has had to do so to keep constant is unsustainable.43
Additionally, as more carbon dioxide is displaced into the
atmosphere, the temperature will rise, resulting in less effective
carbon sinks—reservoirs, typically natural, that absorb more
carbon dioxide from the atmosphere than they release.44 This can
create a “’feedback loop’—a cyclical process triggered by
environmental change that leads back to more change.”45 For
example, scientists had once assumed that oceans would absorb
carbon dioxide and slow global warming.46 However, due to
https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/gaef3516.doc.htm (explaining Botswana’s
concerns and observations of the effects of climate change on their country’s
efforts to reach their sustainability goals) [hereinafter Unprecedented Impacts of
Climate Change] [perma.cc/JD6U-K2GJ].
39. See id. (summarizing the statements from delegates of many nations).
40. See id. (describing the statements from delegates and where many
concluded that drastic measures need to be taken).
41. See Fred Pearce, As Climate Change Worsens, A Cascade of Tipping
Points Looms, YALE ENV’T 360 (Dec. 5, 2019), https://e360.yale.edu/features/asclimate-changes-worsens-a-cascade-of-tipping-points-looms (quoting researchers
who are studying the earth’s climate and consider several different “tipping
points” to be interrelated) [perma.cc/WX2Q-8L4Y].
42. See DAVID HUNTER, DURWOOD ZAELKE, & JAMES SALZMAN, INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 4 (5th ed. 2015) (“Due to the burning of fossil
fuels, such as coal and oil, and the destruction of forests, the atmospheric
concentration CO2 has increased by nearly 40%, from 280 parts per million (ppm)
to 395 ppm between 1750 and 2013, . . . .”).
43. See id. at 28–29 (describing how regular carbon sinks may not be able to
keep up).
44. See id. (describing one scenario where a rising temperature will further
reduce the oceans ability to absorb carbon dioxide).
45. Id. at 29.
46. See id. (explaining how increased temperatures will decrease the ocean’s
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increased global temperatures, the currents that carry carbon
dioxide from the ocean surface and into the depths have slowed,
and the ocean’s “ability to absorb [carbon dioxide] may be reduced
by as much as 50%.”47
Climate change presents global issues that will affect all
peoples, but more significant those who are socioeconomically
disadvantaged.48 While conventional actions must be taken to
reduce emissions and rein in consumption, technology will be
crucial in reducing emission levels, minimizing the effects of
climate change, and addressing issues that arise once climate
crises have begun.
B. What Is Geoengineering?
When geoengineering and climate engineering are referenced
today, the terms typically refer to large-scale schemes designed
and aimed at reducing the effects of climate change.49 Unlike the
historic impact humankind has had on the environment, “the
climate effects of geoengineering are not considered incidental side
effects, but instead constitute intended results.”50 These projects
may range from schemes designed to remove carbon dioxide from

ability to absorb carbon dioxide).
47. Id.
48. See the Facts: How Climate Change Affects People Living in Poverty,
MERCY CORPS (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.mercycorps.org/blog/climate-changepoverty#:~:text=Climate%20change%20threatens%20the%20cleanliness,and%2
0pushes%20people%20into%20poverty (“And it's people living in poverty who
have the most to lose [due to impacts of climate change]. For those on the
frontlines of the crisis, the struggle to earn a living, feed their families and create
safe and stable homes is made more difficult every day.”) [perma.cc/4TR3-8CF3].
49. See What is geoengineering?, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2011, 05:48 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/feb/18/geo-engineering
(“Geoengineering schemes are projects designed to tackle the effects of climate
change directly . . . .”) [perma.cc/X54G-RQNL]; see also What is Geoengineering?,
GEOENGINEERING MONITOR,
http://www.geoengineeringmonitor.org/what-isgeoengineering/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2019) (“Climate geoengineering refers to
large-scale schemes for intervention in the earth’s oceans, soils and atmosphere
with the aim of reducing the effects of climate change, usually temporarily.”)
[perma.cc/HY3H-2MJF].
50. Gerd Winter, Climate Engineering and International Law: Last Resort
or the End of Humanity?, 20 RECIEL 277, 297 (2011).
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the air, commonly referred to as Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR)51,
to schemes designed to reduce the amount of sunlight reaching the
Earth, commonly referred to as Solar Radiation Management
(SRM).52 Despite the wide variety in schemes, “the prominent new
trait of climate engineering is its enormous depth of intervention
into the natural course of the biosphere.”53
Yet, there are important differences between certain types of
CDR and SRM technologies.54 Some technologies, such as
technology for direct air capture of carbon dioxide that filters the
air and removes carbon dioxide, can be considered clean
technology.55 This type of technology typically creates a local
impact that can be measured reasonably accurately.56 Existing
regulations on similar industries like power plants, paper mills,
and chemical plants may also be more easily applied to a carbon
sequestration plant using this type of technology.57 Whereas solar
geoengineering, such as stratospheric aerosols, attempts to alter
the entire climate by reflecting back light from the sun into the

51. See id. at 278 (“Large-scale afforestation, BECS biochar, enhanced
weathering, CO2 air capture, ocean fertilization and CCS are all described as
‘Carbon Dioxide Removal’ (CDR) . . . .”).
52. See What is geoengineering?, supra note 49 (“Geoengineering schemes
are projects designed to tackle the effects of climate change directly, usually by
removing CO2 from the air or limiting the amount of sunlight reaching the
planet’s surface.”); Winter, supra note 50, at 279 (“[W]hereas increasing surface
and cloud albedo, the methods of injecting stratospheric aerosols and installing
space reflectors are known as ‘Solar Radiation Management’ (SRM).”).
53. Winter, supra note 50, at 279.
54. See David Keith, Why I Am Proud to Commercialize Direct Air Capture
while I Oppose Any Commercial Work on Solar Geoengineering, HARV. U. (June 4,
2018), https://keith.seas.harvard.edu/blog/why-i-am-proud-commercialize-directair-capture-while-i-oppose-any-commercial-work-solar
(discussing
the
differences between direct air capture and solar geoengineering technology)
[perma.cc/Q9K4-2YFL]; see also Albert C. Lin, Does Geoengineering Present a
Moral Hazard?, 40 ECOLOGY L. Q. 676–77 (2013) (highlighting the issues
particularly with ocean fertilization, a type of CDR, and stratospheric aerosol
deployment, a type of SRM).
55. See Keith, supra note 54 (explaining why direct air capture technology is
similar to clean energy technology).
56. See id. (“When Carbon Engineering succeeds and large-scale air capture
plants are built, it will be very easy for outside entities such as governments,
third-parties, or citizen groups to monitor the net flows of energy and materials
in and out of the plant . . . .”).
57. See id. (stating that there are applicable regulations already in place).
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atmosphere.58 “Solar geoengineering is large-scale climate
modification which inherently has global consequences that are
difficult to quantify even after deployment.”59 Therefore, as
different forms of geoengineering technology have different
potential consequences and implications, different mechanisms
should be in place to regulate and commercialize these
technologies.60
While new geoengineering technology is being developed today
for climate change, the concept of geoengineering and use of this
technology is not novel.61 In October of 1966, the United States
conducted the test phase for “Project Popeye,” a weather
modification experiment.62 During the test phase, the U.S.
government conducted over fifty cloud seeding experiments where
82% of the seeded clouds produced rain.63 The purpose of the
project was to increase normal rainfall in North Vietnam to
“inhibit overland vehicular movement and to reinforce the
bottlenecks already created at stream crossings . . . .”64 In 1976,
the United Nations General Assembly condemned “Project
Popeye.”65 Major countries such as the United States and Russia,
created and ratified the Environmental Modification Convention
(ENMOD) treaty, which prohibited nations from deliberately
altering weather for hostile purposes.66 From 1976 to 2010, there
were no substantial developments within the United States
58. See id. (“Solar geoengineering is not cleantech . . . . It’s a set of
technologies that might allow humanity to alter the entire climate.”).
59. Id.
60. See id. (arguing that solar geoengineering should not be commercialized).
61. See Mollie Bloudoff-Indelicato, Controlling the Controllers: A Timeline
of Geoengineering Rules and Regulations Worldwide, SCI. AM. (Oct. 25, 2012),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/geoengineering-worldwide-rulesregulations-timeline/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2021) (providing a timeline of the
history of geoengineering in the United States) [perma.cc/ZNY6-FGAN].
62. See 274. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Rusk, OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, DEP’T.
OF STATE (Jan. 13, 1967), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus196468v28/d274 (describing and requesting permission for Project Popeye)
[hereinafter “Project Popeye”] [perma.cc/K9L8-RVQZ].
63. See id. (describing the test phase).
64. Id.
65. See Bloudoff-Indelicato, supra note 61 (summarizing the United States’
history with geoengineering).
66. See id. (summarizing the United States’ history with geoengineering).
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regarding their policy or role in geoengineering.67 However, in
2010, a 193-member U.N. Convention on Biodiversity agreed to
ban climate-related geoengineering activities.68 The Convention
aimed to ban geoengineering on the grounds of “unknown
environmental impacts” that could benefit one country but destroy
another.69 Noticeably, the United States refused to sign the
document.70
1. Concerns about Geoengineering Technology
From the point of view of geoengineering critics, there are two
overarching concerns regarding climate change: (1) That it may
present a moral hazard to invest in climate altering technology
rather than focusing on initiatives to reduce emissions and (2) that
there is a lack of oversight and international agreement on how to
regulate geoengineering.71
The moral hazard concern highlights the tensions between
geoengineering research and deployment as well as the
relationship between geoengineering and other methods of
responding to climate change.72 Critics of geoengineering generally
argue that the development of this technology “gives political
leaders a false but enticing way to avoid confronting the carbon
giants . . . and avoid addressing the root causes of climate chaos.”73
Geoengineering endeavors could “undermine mainstream efforts
to combat climate change.”74

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See e.g., Lin, supra note 54, at 677 (discussing the moral hazard concern);
see also Watts, supra note 1 (highlighting the lack of governmental oversight and
regulations for geoengineering technology).
72. See id. (“The moral hazard concern highlights relationships between
geoengineering research and geoengineering deployment, and more broadly
between geoengineering and other methods of responding to climate change.”).
73. Open Letter to SCoPEx Advisory Committee, GEOENGINEERING MONITOR
(Aug. 21, 2019), http://www.geoengineeringmonitor.org/2019/08/open-letterscopex/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2021) [perma.cc/DK3B-XPB3].
74. Lin, supra note 54, at 674.
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Critics are also concerned about the lack of international
agreement.75 The lack of international agreement could allow “an
individual nation or even a private actor to undertake full-scale
deployment
of
geoengineering
unilaterally,
potentially
precipitating international conflict.”76 Efforts to internationally
discuss and come to a resolution regarding geoengineering have
been starkly opposed.77 United Nations member states have been
reluctant to discuss or reach any consensus for economic or other
reasons.78 As an example within the past year, member nations of
the United Nations tried to discuss the importance of establishing
an international, uniform policy towards geoengineering, or at
least trying to discuss the dangers of geoengineering technology.79
However, the United States and Saudi Arabia, “the world’s two
biggest oil producers,” opposed plans to examine the risks of
climate altering technology.80
While the moral hazard and lack of international agreement
may be troubling, there are compelling reasons why the United
States, in particular, has chosen not to participate in international
discussions about geoengineering technology. For the United
States, climate-engineering technology has the potential to lessen
the severity of the harms of climate change and allow for more
gradual greenhouse gas controls, which would lessen the economic
burden of imposing carbon reduction regulations.81 At this time,
75. See International Regulatory Framework for Geoengineering, ECOLOGIC
(Aug. 2011), https://www.ecologic.eu/4168 (“There are no international rules or
institutions specifically on geoengineering.”) [perma.cc/89S7-NTCC].
76. Lin, supra note 54, at 677.
77. See Watts, supra note 1 (reporting that the initiative for the United
Nations to discuss geoengineering “was block, initially by the US and Saudi
Arabia, then by Japan and other countries”).
78. See id. (implying that the United States’ and Saudi Arabia’s opposition
to discuss geoengineering is because of their economies’ dependence on oil).
79. See id. (“Deeper analysis of the risks had been proposed by Switzerland
and 12 other countries as a first step towards stronger oversight of potentially
world-altering experiments that would have implications for food supply,
biodiversity, global inequality and security.”).
80. See id. (“But sources involved with the talks said the initiative was
blocked, initially by the US and Saudi Arabia, then by Japan and other
countries.”).
81. See Lee Lane, U.S. National Interest, Climate Engineering, and
International Law, HUDSON INST. 1, 2 (2011) (“For the United States, having a
viable CE option would confer two kinds of potential benefits. First, CE might
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more information is needed to effectively govern geoengineering
technology as it continues to develop.82 Geoengineering technology
is in the relatively early stages of development, and the costs of
climate engineering are not entirely predictable.83 Also,
geoengineering technology has unknown risks, which makes it
more difficult to predict the potential side effects of deploying
climate-engineering technologies, and the cost of those effects.84
The concerns about geoengineering are substantial and must
be addressed; however, these concerns may be unnecessarily
preemptive at this time.85 The technology that could have global
effects is still in its very early stages.86 Instead, more needs to be
done to incentivize and create innovation, so when the time comes
for this technology to be deployed, the best technologies are
available for governments and the public to consider.87
III. Intellectual Property–Patents
A. The Balance Between Encouraging Innovation and the Social
Cost to the Public
The fundamental purpose of intellectual property law,
specifically patent law is, “to Promote the Progress of Science and

avoid harm from climate change; second, CE might allow more gradual, and,
hence, less costly, GHG controls and adaptation measures.”).
82. See id. at 4 (“In the face of such great uncertainty, rules must either be
hopelessly vague, or risk distorting future research and policy choices.”).
83. See SCoPEx, supra note 1 (describing SCoPEx as an experiment and not
a test as a test would “make sense late in the development of an engineering
system”); Lane, supra note 81, at 2–3 (estimating the net economic benefits from
climate engineering technology to exceed one trillion dollars).
84. See Lane, supra note 81, at 3 (“U.S. policy makers must weigh the risk
that CE might trigger costly side effects.”).
85. See id. at 4–5 (explaining reasons why the United States may wish to
preserve its freedom of action on climate engineering).
86. See id. (“Such means do not exist with regard to the early stages of
developing and testing CE . . . .”).
87. See id. (“If the United States . . . someday, decides that it wishes to
deploy [climate engineering], affairs would alter. Any state or states seeking to
deploy CE, or even to test it at large scale, would have a motive for trying to
reconcile all bona fide world powers to its actions.”).
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useful Arts.”88 “The principle objective of much of intellectual
property law is the promotion of new and improved works—either
technological or expressive.”89 To accomplish this objective, patent
law is incentive based.90 A patent allows its owner to hold a
monopoly for a limited duration.91 Yet, this comes at a cost.92 The
promise that one will have twenty years to exclusively use and
profit from patented invention, incentivizes individuals to invest
in innovation and creation.93 “[F]ewer people will acquire the work
than if it were distributed on a competitive basis, and they will pay
more for access.”94 Additionally, this may result in a less efficient
allocation of resources.95
B. The Status of Geoengineering Patents Today
Geoengineering technology is a growing industry that appears
to be in its beginning phase.96 Prior to 2008, the combined number
of patent applications and patents granted for geoengineering
technologies did not exceed twenty in a single year.97 Between 2008
88.
89.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
PETER S. MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY, & ROBERT P. MERGES, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2019, 16 (Clause 8 Publishing, ed.
2019) (2019).
90. See id. at 16 (“Both the United States Constitution and judicial decisions
emphasize incentive theory in justifying intellectual property.”).
91. See id. at 19 (describing how intellectual property rights give IP owners
temporary monopolies).
92. See id. (describing intellectual property rights as imposing a social cost
on the public).
93. See id. at 18 (“Instead, the government has created time-limited
intellectual property rights over technological inventions and expressive
creativity to encourage inventors and authors to invest in the development of new
ideas and works of authorship.”).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 19.
96. See Fred Pearce, Geoengineer the Planet? More Scientists Now Say It
Must
Be
an
Option,
YALEENVIRONMENT360
(May
29,
2019),
https://e360.yale.edu/features/geoengineer-the-planet-more-scientists-now-sayit-must-be-an-option (“A spate of dire scientific warnings that the world
community can no longer delay major cuts in carbon emissions . . . has left a
growing number of scientists saying that it’s time to give the controversial
technologies a serious look.”) [perma.cc/K9YJ-SNY4].
97. See Chavez, supra note 14, at 10 (“As the chart demonstrates, before
2008, the combined number of patent applications and patents granted for
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and 2013, the number of patent applications for geoengineering
technology increased five-fold.98
CDR methods have dominated this recent growth, constituting
more than 90% of the geoengineering patents approved by the
USPTO. Specifically, of the patents granted, more than half
(54%) concern carbon capture, and more than one-third (37%)
involve carbon sequestration. Particle-dispersion (4%) and
solar-ray reflection (2%) patents commonly recur, with patents
involving other various methods making up the difference
(3%).99

Between 2001 and 2010, the number of “exotic”
geoengineering patent applications increased from two to
thirty-one—a 1550% increase.100 Given the early stages of
geoengineering technology and lack of established governance
framework, intellectual property will likely have a profound
impact on the development and use of this type of technology.101
The private sector can and should play a vital role in
geoengineering research, subsequent development, and possible
implementation because the private sector is the primary source
for research, development, production, and services.102 However,
within the current scheme of geoengineering technology patents,
there are emerging issues.103 Some issues extend to cover all
geoengineering technologies did not exceed twenty in a single year.”).
98. See id. (describing the increase and rate of increase in patent
applications for geoengineering technologies).
99. Id. at 10–11.
100. Shobita Parthasarathy, A Public Good? 5 (UNIV. OF MICH. GERALD R.
FORD SCH. OF PUB. POL’Y, Working Paper No. STPP 10-1) http://jreynolds.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/03/Parthasarathy-2010-A-Public-Good.pdf (describing the
recent rise in geoengineering patent applications) [perma.cc/9EJR-VCFJ].
101. P. Oldham et al., Mapping the Landscape of Climate Engineering 2,
ROYAL
SOC’Y
PUBL’G
(Dec.
28,
2014),
https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rsta.2014.0065
(“In
the
absence of an established governance framework, the practices of scientific
research and intellectual property tend to shape the field and set trajectories for
future development.”) [perma.cc/4TUE-SQN6].
102. See Reynolds, supra note 13, at 2 (explaining that it is likely that the
private sector will drive innovation in this field and highlighting that many times
states do not take on the endeavor themselves but rely on the private sector for
innovation).
103. See e.g., Parthasarathy, supra note 100, at 10 (describing the high risks
of geoengineering technologies and how the current patent system cannot
adequately address these characteristics); Chavez, supra note 14, at 9–17
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geoengineering patents, while others appear to apply only to
specific areas of geoengineering, such as SRM and CDR
technologies.
The majority of geoengineering patents are assigned to the
same patent holders, thus concentrating the potential for this
technology in the hands of a few.104 Original patent holders tend to
transfer their ownership to many of the same assignees, some of
which are non-practicing entities.105 This could allow a few owners
to dictate how the field of geoengineering develops.106 Scholars
have cautioned against keeping the status quo and allowing the
geoengineering industry to develop in the same manner as the
biotechnology industry developed.107 One academic speaking on
the topic stated:
If we continue to deal with geoengineering patents as we did in
biotechnology, we would create problems that are similar—or
perhaps even worse—because of the high risk, high reward
nature of the technology. The patent holders will control
whether and how geoengineering technology will be researched
and used.108

In the biotechnology industry, the concentration of patent
ownership among a few entities incentivized the limited grant of
exclusive licenses, incentivized patent owners to charge incredibly
high prices, and allowed these patent holders to dictate the
development of the industry.109
(warning that the development of geoengineering IP was resulting in
anti-commons and patent thickets); Reynolds, supra note 13, at 3 (describing
emerging issues with SRM technologies).
104. See Chavez, supra note 14, at 11 (“A review of these patents further
reveals that many of these inventions are assigned to only a few patent holders.”).
105. See id. (“Consequently, the future development of these technologies is
concentrated in the hands of a few.”); Parthasarathy, supra note 100, at 5
(“Non-practicing entities . . . and commercial ventures, in particular, have filed
applications for a number of variants on one technology, often resulting in one or
a handful of innovators controlling a significant proportion of the patents in a
particular method of geoengineering.”).
106. See Parthasarathy, supra note 100, at 6 (“While this may just be a result
of the small number of applications to date, it could allow a relatively small
number of owners to control innovation in a particular area of geoengineering.”).
107. See id. at 7–8 (describing the biotechnology industry as a cautionary
tale).
108. Id. at 8.
109. See id. at 7–8 (using Myriad Genetics’ patents on the BRCA genes as an
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The critiques of the development of the biotechnology industry
parallel many of the global concerns about the distribution of not
only geoengineering technology, but more broadly “green”
technology.110 “Concerns over patent system and climate change
have already caused serious political tensions.”111 Geographic
imbalances in patenting behaviors and problems with the costs of
technology acquisition for developing countries will “further
exacerbate existing intellectual property trade, and scientific
differences and [will] generate political tensions along the
North-South divide.”112
There are also specific problems tied to the development of
CDR technologies.113 Many of these issues arise from the novelty
of the field, lack of development of standardized technology, patent
examiners’ lack of expertise in the new technology, and applicants’
desires to capture the largest possible grant of protection.114 In this
area of geoengineering technology, extremely broad patents are
being granted, and there appears to be a “land grab” taking
place.115 A land grab “occurs when a lack in clarity of future
technologies encourages speculators to seek patents in developing
fields, which in turn causes actual inventors to file patent
applications to avoid a competitive disadvantage.”116 An example
of an extremely broad patent is Patent No. 8,603,424,
“CO2-sequestering formed building materials,” which in its own

example of this phenomena).
110. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Patent System and Climate Change, 16 VA. J.
L. & TECH. 301, 320 (2011) (explaining the concerns about the patent system’s role
in promoting climate change technology development and dissemination given
the unbalanced nature of worldwide innovation, patenting, and ownership).
111. Id. at 306.
112. Id. at 320.
113. See Chavez, supra note 14, at 13–17 (describing how the current patent
system exacerbates geoengineering patent-issues).
114. Id. at 14 (citing Amber Rose Stiles, Hacking Through the Thicket: A
Proposed Patent Pooling Solution to the Nanotechnology “Building Block” Patent
Thicket Problem, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 555, 563 (2012)).
115. See id. at 13 (“Indeed, climate engineering appears to be undergoing a
‘patent land-grab.’”).
116. Id.
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language specifically rejects any limitations upon its terms.117 This
patent is not set to expire until November 8, 2029.118
There are three main reasons why a “land grab” and patents,
such as No. 8,603,424, are troubling in this space.119 First,
geoengineering is in its infancy; scientists have contemplated
using technology to combat climate change for fewer than fifteen
years.120 Second, many of the granted patents are overly broad and
poorly defined.121 Early owners could own huge swaths of the field,
thus “deter[ring] future innovation and bestow[ing] control over
technology with potentially immeasurable societal value to only a
few.”122 Third, granted geoengineering patents tend to be the
“building-block patents,” on which later inventions must rely.123
Building-block patents are distinct from “incremental
improvement patents, which have a much narrower claim
scope.”124 While building-block patents may not be very profitable,
they can be crucial for downstream development.125 Conversely, too
many building-block patents can “lock up technologies” and slow
development. 126 “[T]hey allow patent holders to deny licenses,
117. See CO2-Sequestering Formed Building Materials, GOOGLE PATENTS,
https://patents.google.com/patent/US8603424B2/en (last visited Feb. 19, 2020)
(listing the basic information for Patent No. US 8,603,424) [perma.cc/8Z8Z-FC37];
see also Chavez, supra note 97, at 12 (using this patent as an example of an
over-broad patent).
118. See CO2-Sequestering Formed Building Materials, supra note 117
(listing the adjusted expiration as Nov. 8, 2029).
119. See Chavez, supra note 97, at 13–14 (explaining why a patent land-grab
is particularly pernicious in this space).
120. See id. at 13 (“Scientists have contemplated climate engineering as a
response to climate change for less than one decade.”).
121. See id. (describing the types of patents that have been issued for
geoengineering technologies).
122. Id. at 14.
123. See id. at 13 (“Because of this [early in the development of the field],
applications often seek building-block patents, which cover fundamental products
and processes.”).
124. Id. at 14 (quoting John C. Miller & Drew L. Harris, The Carbon Nanotube
Patent Landscape, 3 NANOTECH L. & BUS. 427, 435 (2006)).
125. See Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601,
611–12 (2005) (“But largely because they were funded by the federal government
before the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, they granted nonexclusive licenses to all
comers, meaning that their patents raised the cost of practicing biotechnology but
did not prevent anyone from entering the downstream market.”).
126. See Chavez, supra note 14, at 13 (“Awarding building-block patents,
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charge exorbitant royalties, or engage in delaying tactics, most
notably litigation.”127 The combination of inventors’ filing
applications early on to avoid a competitive disadvantage and the
lack
of
existing
geoengineering
research
make
the
climate-engineering
environment
ripe
for
opportunistic
exploitation.128
The development of SRM technology has taken a slightly
different course than CDR technology and appears to be
proceeding in a publicly oriented manner.129 As of 2020, many of
these solar geoengineering patent families have been abandoned
and very few remain.130 In part, that is due to the unique nature of
SRM technology.131 SRM technologies most likely will be
transnational.132 Solar geoengineering research, development, and
implementation would be public goods in the sense that they would
provide nonexcludable and non-rivalrous benefits of expected
lessened climate change.133 There also appears to be an emerging
culture and practice among SRM researchers of sharing data
freely, and there is little evidence that researchers are keeping the
data to themselves or taking protective measures to maintain
trade secrecy in the know-how.134

especially early in an industry’s development, can frustrate the field’s growth.”).
127. Id.
128. See id. (“Coupled with the increasing number of patent applications for
related technologies, the lack of geoengineering research makes the
climate-engineering environment ripe for opportunistic exploitation.”).
129. See Reynolds, supra note 13, at 3 (describing the indications that solar
geoengineering is proceeding in a publicly oriented manner).
130. See id. at 2 (“Of these [patents and patent application families], 13 had
been abandoned, 5 had expired, and 17 were related to space- and surface-based
techniques, which are generally regarded as prohibitively expensive, of limited
capacity, and/or otherwise infeasible.”).
131. See id at 2–3 (detailing the unique characteristics of solar
geoengineering).
132. See id. at 3 (“First, any implementation would inherently have
transnational effects.”).
133. See id. at 2 (“After all, solar geoengineering research, development, and
implementation would be public goods, not necessarily in a normative sense but
in the economic sense of providing the nonexcludable and nonrivalrous benefits
of expected lessened climate change.”).
134. See id. (explaining the present culture and practice among solar
geoengineering researchers).
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Additionally, the market for SRM technology will be quite
different.135 One author predicts that the field of SRM technology
will become a monopsony (or oligopsony) procurement structure,
like there is in the national defense and transportation
industries.136 Monopsony and oligopsony are market conditions
where there is only one buyer or a small number of buyers,
respectively.137 Estimates predict that the direct financial cost of
global solar geoengineering deployment will be approximately $25
to $50 billion with additional annual spending in monitoring and
related activities.138 There likely will be a substantial opportunity
for private companies to profit from these technologies.139
The two largest issues facing the development of SRM
technology and intellectual property are:
(1) That any
implementation would inherently have transnational effects, and
(2) that it is difficult to distinguish purely SRM research and
innovation from non-SRM research and innovation.140 SRM
technology would have global effects.141 Given its global effects,
collaboration and transfer of know-how will be essential for
research and innovation in this field.142 Additionally, there are few
patents that will strictly be “SRM” patents.143 Many of the
135. See id. at 3 (predicting the market structure for solar geoengineering
technologies).
136. See id. (“We believe that large-scale research, development, and potential
implementation of solar geoengineering are most likely to assume a monopsony
(or oligopsony) procurement structure, as it has in the national defense and
transportation sectors.”).
137. See Julie Young, Monopsony, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 3, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/monopsony.asp (defining monopsony and
oligopsony) [perma.cc/9JU5-EYZ7].
138. See Reynolds, supra note 13, at 3 (“Looking toward possible
implementation, estimates of the direct financial cost of global solar
geoengineering deployment are approximately US $25 to 50 billion annually.”).
139. See id. (“This implies that providing technology, materials, and services
could be a moderately sized industry generating significant profits.”).
140. See id. (explaining the two challenges of solar geoengineering patents).
141. See id. (explaining how the transnational effects of climate change create
an interesting dilemma where control to data access law remain within national
jurisdictions yet governmental legislators and regulators are reluctant to tackle
the issue).
142. See id. (“[B]ut we also expect research and innovation to be collaborative
and to transfer know-how and technologies across borders.”).
143. See id. (explaining that there is not a clear line between non-SRM and
strictly SRM technology).
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components necessary for successful SRM technology will come
from devices and technology successful in other industries.144 For
example, the developers of inkjet printers are involved in research
to create a nozzle to spray fine salt water mist without clogging
that could be used for marine cloud brightening.145 Identifying
“SRM” technology is difficult as many inventions will have
dual-use, uses applicable in multiple fields.146
C. Solutions That Have Already Been Provided
In response to these emerging issues, multiple scholars have
offered possible solutions and suggestions about how the patent
system should adapt or change for geoengineering technology.147
Several scholars have advocated for a separate entity within the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to review
geoengineering patent applications more closely and with
additional scrutiny.148 Others advocate for creating patent pools,
and either additionally or as an alternative, create a research
commons.149 Many have touched upon whether march-in rights or
implementing compulsory licenses is another appropriate response
to the developing system.150 However, due to the limited cases
144. See id. (“Likewise, inventions developed in contexts outside of solar
geoengineering would have applications therein, and those that seem exclusive to
solar geoengineering would have uses elsewhere.”).
145. See id. (providing an example of how developers of inkjet printers are
involved in creating a nozzle that can spray an extremely fine mist of salt water
without clogging).
146. See id. (“A second difficulty for IP and data access policies is that there
is no clear line between, on the one hand, research and innovation within solar
geoengineering and, on the other, activities outside of the field.”).
147. See Reynolds, supra note 13, at 5–6 (proposing four recommendations
regarding IP for solar geoengineering); Parthasarathy, supra note 100, at 11–12
(proposing four recommendations for geoengineering patent development);
Chavez, supra note 97, at 31–35 (advocating for the United States to establish a
patent pool).
148. See e.g., Parthasarathy, supra note 100, at 11–12 (proposing
recommendations for a sui generis patent system).
149. See e.g., Chavez, supra note 14, at 31–35 (advising that the US develop
unique procedures to approve these patent applications and form a
geoengineering patent pool to facilitate innovation and accessibility).
150. See e.g., id. at 21–27 (discussing the viability of compulsory licensing for
geoengineering patents); see also Reynolds, supra note 14, at 4 (dismissing
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discussing march-in rights (none have been granted) and
compulsory licenses, scholars have urged the government to clarify
the conditions under which it would exercise march-in rights,
compulsory licenses, or other mechanisms to grant licenses.151
D. Different Mechanisms Through Which the United States
Government Interferes in the Patent System to Grant Licenses
1. The Bayh-Dole Act and Origin of March-In Rights
The federal government plays a large role in the development
of U.S. technologies in the private sector through financial
assistance and funding.152 Yet, the aid of federal funding brings
questions about who owns the rights to the invention once
patented.153 What interest does the U.S. government retain when
it plays a purely financial role in the development of the patented
invention?
In the 1960s, the Kennedy administration implemented the
“Government Patent Policy.”154 Under the policy, the United States
was the default owner of the rights to inventions developed
through government contracts and government funding.155 Yet,
there were specific circumstances where the contractor could
march-in rights or compulsory licenses as a potential solution because only very
rare circumstances trigger their use).
151. See e.g., Reynolds, supra note 13, at 6 (“The fourth and final proposal is
for governments to clarify the conditions under which they would: exercise
march-in rights . . . .”).
152. See Oldham, supra note 101, at 7 (stating that the “climate engineering
research funding is dominated by the US National Science Foundation (NSF), the
UK Natural Environment Research Council (NERC), the European Commission,
the US Department of Energy and NASA with the National Natural Science
Foundation of China appearing seventh in the rankings.”).
153. See JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44597, MARCH-IN RIGHTS
UNDER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT, 1, 5–6 (2016) (discussing the history of how the
federal government considered the implications of public funding in intellectual
property research and development).
154. See id. at 5 (explaining the early beginnings of granting rights for
intellectual property made with public funding to government contractors).
155. See id. (“This early ‘Government Patent Policy’ generally allowed the
U.S. government to retain rights to inventions developed through government
contracts.”).
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obtain title to the patent.156 If a contractor obtained title, the
patent was still “subject to the government acquiring at least an
irrevocable non-exclusive royalty free license throughout the world
for governmental purposes.”157 Further, the 1963 policy contained
an additional policy, which became the prelude to today’s march-in
rights:
Where the principal or exclusive (except as against the
government) rights to an invention are acquired by the
contractor, the government shall have the right to require the
granting of a license to an applicant royalty free or on terms
that are reasonable in the circumstances to the extent that the
invention is required for public use by governmental
regulations or as may be necessary to fulfill health needs, or for
other public purposes stipulated in the contract.158

However, Congress became increasingly concerned that the
United States was falling behind the pace of technological
advancement.159 Congress accepted the proposition that, “the lack
of patent title discouraged private enterprise from advancing
early-stage technologies into the marketplace.”160 In 1980,
Congress enacted the Bayh-Dole Act, which allowed non-profits,
universities, and small businesses to elect to retain title to any
invention that was made under federally funded research and
development.161 In February 1983, through an executive order,
President Reagan extended the Bayh-Dole Act to apply to all
parties that contract with the United States, regardless of their

156. See id. (“However, the contractor could obtain title in specified
circumstances.”).
157. Statement of Government Patent Policy, 28 Fed. Reg. 10943, 10945 (Oct.
10, 1963).
158. See Thomas, supra note 153, at 5 (quoting Statement of Government
Patent Policy, 28 Fed. Reg. 10943, 10945 (Oct. 10, 1963)).
159. See Titus Galama & James Hosek, Is the United States Losing Its Edge
in
Science
and
Technology?,
RAND
CORP.
(2008),
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/2008/RAND_RB93
47.pdf (“In the mid-2000s, numerous public and private sector reports argued that
the United States is falling behind, and Capitol Hill responded with a wave of
policy initiatives.”) [perma.cc/5P6G-K8DG].
160. Thomas, supra note 153, at 5.
161. See id. at 6 (“Under the Bayh-Dole Act, each nonprofit organization
(including universities) or small business is permitted to elect within a reasonable
time to retain title to any ‘subject invention’ made under federally funded R&D.”).
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size.162 The executive order has been upheld and maintained since
it went into place.163
While the Bayh-Dole Act gave contractors the rights to
inventions, the act also provided that the United States
government had march-in rights.164 “March-in rights allow the
government, in specified circumstances, to require the contractor
or successors in title to the patent to grant a ‘nonexclusive,
partially exclusive, or exclusive license’ to a ‘responsible applicant
or applicants.’”165 In essence, the government could “march in” and
grant licenses for patents that were the product of publicly funded
research and development.166 If the patent owner refused to grant
a license, the government can grant the license itself.167 Exercising
march-in rights does not invalidate the patent; rather, it grants
permission for an enterprise, identified by the government, to
practice the patented invention.168 To invoke march-in rights, one
of four circumstances must be met:
(1) action is necessary because the contractor or assignee has
not taken, or is not expected to take within a reasonable time,
effective steps to achieve practical application of the subject
invention in such field of use;
(2) action is necessary to alleviate health or safety needs which
are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or their
licensees;
(3) action is necessary to meet requirements for public use
specified by Federal regulations and such requirements are not
reasonably satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or licensees; or
(4) action is necessary because the agreement required by
162. See id. (“[T]hen-President Ronald Reagan ordered all agencies to treat,
as allowable by law, all contractors within the Bayh-Dole Act framework
regardless of their size.”).
163. Id.
164. See id. at 7 (explaining the mechanics of march-in rights under the
Bayh-Dole Act).
165. Id.
166. See id. (“The Bayh-Dole Act provides the government with the ability to
‘march in’ and grant licenses for patents that resulted from publicly funded
R&D.”).
167. See id. (“If the patent owner refuses to do so, the government may grant
the license itself.”).
168. See id. (explaining how march-in rights affects the patent and assignee’s
rights).
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section 204 [generally requiring that patented products be
manufactured substantially in the United States unless
domestic manufacture is not commercially feasible] has not
been obtained or waived or because a license of the exclusive
right to use or sell any subject invention in the United States is
in breach of its agreement obtained pursuant to section 204. 169

“Practical application” under subsection one is further defined as,
[T]o manufacture in the case of a composition or product, to
practice in the case of a process or method, or to operate in the
case of a machine or system; and, in each case, under such
conditions as to establish that the invention is being utilized
and that its benefits are to the extent permitted by law or
Government regulations available to the public on reasonable
terms.170

Following enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act, however, march-in
rights have not been exercised.171 The National Institute of Health
(NIH) has received six petitions for the NIH to “‘march in’ with
respect to a particular pharmaceutical.”172 Yet, each petition has
been denied.173 Petitioners filed for march-in rights for several
reasons mainly focusing on the drug’s price.174 NIH has declined to
exercise march-in rights for high drug prices, because this type of
scenario does not fit into any of the four statutory provisions175 and
169. 35 U.S.C. § 203(a).
170. Thomas, supra note 153, at 7 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 201(f)).
171. See id. at 8 (“March-in rights have never been exercised during the
35-year history of the Bayh-Dole Act.”).
172. Id.
173. See Policies and Reports, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH OFF. OF INTRAMURAL
RSCH. & OFF. OF TECH. TRANSFER, https://www.ott.nih.gov/policy/policies-reports
(listing the National Institute of Health’s march-in responses) [perma.cc/Q9GCZXW2]; see also Thomas, supra note 153, at 8 (“Each petition was denied.”).
174. See e.g., NIH Decision on Xtandi March-In Request, DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS., NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH (June 7, 2016 & June 20, 2016),
https://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policy/pdfs/Final_Response
_Goldman_6.20.2016.pdf (responding to concerns that the price of Xtandi® is too
high) [perma.cc/25KE-57RZ]; see also March-In Position Paper in the Case of
Xalatan, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH (Sept. 17, 2004),
https://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policy/March-inxalatan.pdf (responding to concerns that the price of Xalatan® is too high)
[perma.cc/N8AB-Z3YY].
175. See March-In Determination in the Case of Norvir (November 2013),
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH (Nov. 1, 2013),
https://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policy/March-In-
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discrepancies between drug prices in the United States and other
countries are “appropriately left for Congress to address
legislatively.”176
The requests to initiate march-in rights to combat rising drug
prices and the government’s lack of action to exercise of march-in
rights has led to a renewed debate about the pros and cons of
march-in rights.177 Some proponents of march-in rights in this
context believe that “U.S. taxpayers should be protected from what
they view as excessive profiteering on technologies developed with
public funding.”178 Other proponents assert that the Bayh-Dole Act
“has had a powerful price-control clause since its enactment in
1980 that mandates that inventions resulting from federally
funded research must be sold at reasonable prices.”179 Therefore,
the solution to high drug prices can be solved within the Act as it
is already written, through the unused, unenforced march-in
provision of the Act.180
The proponents’ argument rests on the “reasonable terms”
within the definition of “practical application.”181 Several courts,
including the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits
and district courts have interpreted “reasonable terms” in similar
contexts to include price.182 “The terms required by the Bayh-Dole
Norvir2013.pdf (addressing each of petitioners’ claims in light of the statute’s
text) [perma.cc/2PM7-F24T].
176. March-In Position Paper in the Case of Xalatan, supra note 174, at 6.
177. See e.g., Joseph Allen, ‘The Washington Post’ Misses the Mark on
March-In
Rights,
IP
WATCHDOG
(Apr.
22,
2019),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/04/22/washington-post-misses-mark-marchrights/id=108499/ (explaining why under the Bayh-Dole Act the NIH was correct
in denying petitioners’ requests for the federal government to march-in due to
high drug prices) [perma.cc/B5LD-LP2R].
178. Thomas, supra note 153, at 1–2.
179. Peter S. Arno & Michael H. Davis, Why Don’t We Enforce Existing Drug
Price Controls? The Unrecognized and Unenforced Reasonable Pricing
Requirements Imposed Upon Patents Deriving in Whole or in Part from Federally
Funded Research, 75 TUL. L. REV. 631, 631 (2001).
180. See id. (concluding that “the solution to high drug prices does not involve
new legislation but already exists in the unused, unenforced march-in provision
of the Bayh-Dole Act”).
181. See id. at 649 (explaining the importance of the phrase “available to the
public on reasonable terms” within 35 U.S.C. § 201(f) (1994)).
182. See id. at 650 (explaining the courts’ history of interpreting the phrase
“reasonable terms”).
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Act include, but are not limited to, reasonable prices.”183 A price is
unreasonable if the unit price is “too high or if its use over the long
term makes it too costly with respect to the investment, costs, and
profits of the manufacturer.”184 “The requirement for ‘practical
application’ seems clearly to authorize the federal government to
review the prices of drugs developed with public funding under
Bayh-Dole terms and to mandate march-in when prices exceed a
reasonable level.”185
Opponents of using march-in rights to combat rising drug
prices include the two primary sponsors of the law.186 Senators
Birch Bayh and Robert Dole responded with an editorial in the
Washington Post, which plainly stated, “Bayh-Dole did not intent
that government set prices on resulting products . . . . The law
instructs the government to revoke such licenses only when the
private industry collaborator has not successfully commercialized
the invention as the product.”187 Additionally, Norman Latker, the
former NIH patent counsel, and Howard Bremer, with the
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, sent statements to NIH
opposing the proposed misuse of march-in rights as “contrary to
the law.”188
In their statements, opponents of granting march-in rights in
this context also highlighted the benefits of the current, unaltered
scheme.189 Their statements explained that the Act has created
new companies, new jobs, and contributes enormously to the U.S.
economy.190 Companies that have developed some of the most
183. Id. at 651.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See Allen, supra note 177 (quoting Senator Bayh and stating that
Senators Bayh and Dole reject the argument that under the Act the federal
government can use march-in rights to combat rising drug prices).
187. Birch Bayh and Robert Dole, Our Law Helps Patients Get New Drugs
Sooner, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2002) at A28.
188. Allen, supra note 177.
189. See generally NIH Public Meeting on Norvi/Ritonavir March-in Request,
NAT’L
INST.
OF
HEALTH
&
HUM.
SERVS.
(May
25,
2004),
https://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2004NorvirMtg/2004Norvir
Mtg.pdf (compiling the statements of those who opposed granting march-in
rights) [perma.cc/Y3UB-LGAX].
190. See id. at 5 (“The Economist estimated that Bayh-Dole created 2,000 new
companies, 260,000 new jobs, and now contributes $40 billion annually to the U.S.

820

27 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 791 (2021)

valuable drugs for curing human diseases were created because of
the funding boost the federal government provided.191 Further, a
change in march-in policy could undermine the ability of
universities to make their federally funded technologies available
for public benefit and the incentive for the private sector to invest
in federally funded discoveries.192 While this debate was centered
around rising drug prices, the debate illustrates the underlying
tension and concerns about invoking march-in rights, and
therefore their limited applicability and use.
2. US Government’s Eminent Domain–Like Power Under 28
U.S.C. § 1498
Another mechanism that can be used by the United States
government to grant licenses to U.S. patents is through 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498.193 Section 1498 of the United States Code provides the
United States government and its contractors with the ability to
use or manufacture an invention described in and covered by a
United States patent.194 The patent owner’s remedy is to bring an
action against the United States in the US Court of Federal Claims
“for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for
such use and manufacture.”195 The patent owner may not enjoin
the United States from using their invention.196
Section 1498(a) of the United States Code operates separately
from the Bayh-Dole Act, and there are three significant
distinctions from march-in rights.197 First, unlike march-in rights,
economy.”).
191. See id. at 30 (“The award of the NCDDG-AIDS grant gave the HIV
project a much-needed funding boost. In my opinion, it catalyzed the development
of the antiviral program.”).
192. See id. at 36 (“The ability of universities to make their federally funded
technologies available for public benefit would be undermined, and the incentive
for the private sector to invest in federally funded discoveries would be
removed.”).
193. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2018) (discussing licenses with patents).
194. Id. § 1498(a).
195. Id.
196. Id. § 1498.
197. See Thomas, supra note 153, at 8 (“Three significant distinctions exist
between march-in rights under the Bayh-Dole Act and 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).”).
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the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1498 is not limited to only patented
inventions that were developed with the support of federal funds;
the provision applies to every U.S. patent.198 Second, the provision
applies when the federal government or its contractors practice the
patented invention, whereas with march-in rights, private
enterprises may initiate requesting march-in rights from the
government.199 Third, the scheme for compensation is different.200
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) the patent owner, “commences litigation
and may be awarded damages to compensate for the use of the
government or its contractors.”201 Whereas under the Bayh-Dole
Act, recipients of march-in rights are awarded licenses and
presumably pay royalties to the owner of the patent.202
3. Compulsory Licensing
A third mechanism the U.S. government may use to interfere
with the United States patent system is to grant compulsory
licenses.203 Compulsory licensing provides that the government
has the ability to require that an owner of a patent license the use
of their rights.204 In the United States, unlike many other
countries, there is not a general compulsory licensing scheme.205
Rather, Congress in a few circumstances has created limited
compulsory licensing statutes, such as the Atomic Energy Act of
198. See id. (contrasting march-in rights and 28 U.S.C. § 1498).
199. See id. (contrasting march-in rights and 28 U.S.C. § 1498).
200. See id. (contrasting march-in rights and 28 U.S.C. § 1498).
201. Id.
202. See id. (contrasting march-in rights and 28 U.S.C. § 1498).
203. See Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, WORLD TRADE
ORG.
(Mar.
2018),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_faq_e.htm
(“Compulsory licensing is when a government allows someone else to produce a
patented product or process without the consent of the patent owner . . . .”)
[perma.cc/4ZV6-PSHT].
204. See id. (explaining compulsory licensing).
205. See Mark W. Lauroesch, General Compulsory Patent Licensing in the
United States: Good in Theory, but not Necessary in Practice, 6 SANTA CLARA HIGH
TECH. L. J. 41, 41 (1990) (“Unlike a number of foreign countries, no ‘general’
compulsory licensing statute, applicable to all patents that have not been
practiced or have been used for anticompetitive purposes, exists in this country
[the United States].”).
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1954 and the Clean Air Act of 1970.206 Although there is not a
general compulsory licensing scheme in the United States, the
Constitution permits limited compulsory licensing statutes as well
as a potential general licensing statute.207
Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution is the primary
source of Congress’ authority to enact laws concerning patents and
intellectual property broadly.208 Some authors have expressed that
the term “exclusive rights” within clause 8 prevents the
government from constitutionally granting a nonexclusive patent,
which would be the result with compulsory licensing.209
Additionally, some authors argue the government’s power to take
patents is limited to takings for the public benefit and that
“compulsory licensing results in the confiscation of private
property only for the benefit of a private citizen, the licensee.”210
However, both of these arguments fail. The purpose of
compulsory licensing would be for the public’s benefit.211
Compulsory licensing is used to, “ensure that the public receives
the benefit of an innovation as soon as possible rather than only
after [twenty] years.”212 Additionally, the term “exclusive rights”
should not be interpreted as establishing the only rights that
Congress can grant, but to indicate that “exclusive rights” was the
maximum that Congress could grant.213 Further, in Sony
Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,214 the
206. See id. at 46 (“Provisions permitting compulsory licenses have been
included in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Plant Variety Protection Act, the
Clean Air Act of 1970, and the Copyright Act of 1976.”).
207. See id. at 44–47 (explaining why the U.S. Constitution would permit a
general compulsory licensing statute).
208. See id. at 44 (stating the source of Congress’ power to enact patent laws).
209. See id. (explaining some of the constitutional arguments against
compulsory licensing).
210. Id. at 44–45.
211. See id. at 45 (“The granting of a general compulsory license under a
working requirement would, however, be in the public interest.”).
212. Id.
213. See id. (“Moreover, the word ‘exclusive’ in clause 8 should not be
interpreted as establishing the only type of intellectual property right that
Congress may grant, but instead only as emphasizing the greatest extent of the
rights it may grant.”).
214. Sony Corp. of Am. V. Univ. Cty. Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(holding that Sony’s sale of video tape recorders to the general public does not
constitute contributory infringement of copyrights).
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Supreme Court stated that, “[a]s the text of the Constitution
makes plain, it is Congress that has been assigned the task of
defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted
to authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate
access to their work product.”215 Therefore, Congress has the
flexibility to determine the balance and incentives to disclose
inventions, encourage innovation, and ensure that patents are
practiced for the public’s benefit.216
Opponents of compulsory licensing also tend to highlight that
“those who believe they are attacking the abuses of the [patent]
system may inadvertently damage the patent system itself.”217
Compulsory licensing could destroy research incentives, which is
an integral component of the patent system.218 This could occur if
the royalties provided for under a compulsory licensing scheme are
not comparable to royalties that would be received under a
voluntary licensing scheme.219 The royalties under a compulsory
licensing scheme may not allow the patent holder to fully recoup
research and development costs.220 Inventors and companies may
be less willing to invest time and money in research and
development, if there is a possibility that they will not be able to
reap the financial benefits of a patented technology.221

215. Id. at 429.
216. See Lauroesch, supra note 205, at 45 (concluding that “the framers’
intent has been interpreted not merely to ensure disclosure of inventions, but also
to encourage innovation so that society can enjoy and benefit from the disclosure
of inventions”).
217. Id. at 53 (quoting Fortas, The Patent System in Distress, 53 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 810, 820 (1971)).
218. See id. (“Similarly, opponents of compulsory licensing argue that such
licensing provisions would destroy the research incentive that is so integral to the
patent system.”).
219. See id. (“This position would appear to be most valid if the royalties
granted under a compulsory licensing system were not comparable to those that
would be obtained under voluntary licensing.”).
220. See id. (explaining that an investor or inventor devotes time and money
not only to patentable inventions but also all the prior unsuccessful experiments
and inventions that came before it).
221. See id. (explaining that an investor or inventor is motivated in part to
devote their time and money because of the expectation that they are going to
recoup their investment or make more of a profit).
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Further, the notion of implementing compulsory licenses
within the United States patent system is generally disfavored.222
Because of this hesitancy to use the compulsory licensing
provisions within specific statutes, such as the Clean Air and
Atomic Energy Acts, the courts have expressed resistance to
awarding compulsory licenses.223 The Supreme Court has stated,
“Compulsory licensing is a rarity in our patent system,”224 and it is
typically considered a last resort.225
However, despite the potential problems of compulsory
licensing there can be significant benefits.226 Advocates for a
general compulsory licensing scheme have highlighted four main
potential benefits.227 “[G]eneral compulsory licensing could help
put unused or unmarketed patented products in the consumers’
hands when patentees have not made efforts to practice their
inventions.”228 Also, compulsory licensing could combat patent
suppression.229 Patent suppression occurs when other patent
holders have no intention to practice or license an improvement
patent, but they use their patent simply to block competitors.230
Further, compulsory licensing could also reduce wasted energy on
“invent around” products, which consume significant amounts of
time and effort to create imitation products that circumvent the

222. See Chavez, supra note 14, at 22 (“Yet, the U.S. patent system generally
disfavors compulsory licensing.”).
223. See id. (explaining that only on a few occasions has the court imposed
compulsory licensing).
224. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980).
225. See Chavez, supra note 14, at 22 (“And although courts recognize
compulsory licensing as a solution for antitrust violations, it is considered a
remedy of last resort.”).
226. See Laureosch, supra note 205, at 42 (“Although some people support
compulsory licensing purely out of distaste for the patent system, there appears
to be a number of positive effects that could potentially result from compulsory
licensing.”).
227. See id. at 42–44 (describing four benefits of a general compulsory
licensing scheme).
228. Id. at 42.
229. See id. at 43 (“A second potential benefit of compulsory licensing is it
might combat patent suppression.”).
230. See id. (explaining the detriment patent suppression can have on
consumers).
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actual patent.231 Lastly, compulsory licensing “could be used as a
remedy for patent misuse and antitrust violations.”232
IV. Proposing a Solution to Geoengineering Patenting Issues
The complexities and early-stage development of
geoengineering technologies warrant the creation and use of a
specialized compulsory licensing scheme.233 There is a growing and
immediate need for technologies that can help mitigate and slow
the effects of climate change.234 Without the use of CDR and SRM
technologies, it is almost certain that human and wildlife
populations will be affected, and that poorer and marginalized
communities will be disproportionately affected.235
Additionally, geoengineering technologies that will be
deployed, need to be high quality and thoroughly tested.236
Geoengineering
technologies,
particularly
solar-radiation
management technologies, will have transnational effects.237
Geoengineering technologies are “high risk technologies with the
potential for a high reward; their impacts, positive and negative,
are global in scope and if [the technology] does damage, it is likely
to be irreversible.”238 Also, predictions about the effects of
geoengineering technology are based, in large part, on computer

231. See id. (explaining that “[s]ignificant amounts of time and efforts are
expended to create imitation products by inventing around patents”).
232. Id. at 44.
233. See supra Part III.D. 3. Compulsory Licensing (discussing compulsory
licensing).
234. See e.g., Pearce, supra note 41 (warning that the globe may have
surpassed a threshold for a cascade of inter-related tipping points); see also
HUNTER, supra note 42 (explaining that the rise in global temperatures affects
remaining carbon sinks and diminishes their ability to absorb carbon dioxide
further exacerbating the effects of climate change).
235. See OLSSON, supra note 22, at 802 (explaining that because people who
are poor and marginalized usually have the least buffer to face modest climate
hazards they tend to suffer most).
236. See Parthasarathy, supra note 100, at 10 (describing the high risks of
geoengineering technologies).
237. See Reynolds, supra note 13, at 3 (describing SRM technology as
transnational and providing a public good).
238. Parthasarathy, supra note 100, at 10.
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modeling.239 Computer modeling is only as good as the data that is
put into the system.240 The input of multiple inventors and
research groups will be required to adequately assess the benefits
and problems with certain geoengineering technologies.241
Further, there is a risk that allowing one patent holder of a
broad, foundational patent could allow that patent rights holder to
single handedly control the development of that technology.242
Without multiple parties working to invent better technologies, a
monopoly of the industry, or a particular swath of that industry,
for twenty years could result in sub-par technology.243 Competition
in an industry promotes innovation, and given the transnational
effects of geoengineering inventions, patent holders and countries
should be exercising the utmost caution with deploying technology
that may not be the best equipped or most advanced.244
A. Determining Which U.S. Government Action Would Best
Promote Innovation Given the Unique Features of Geoengineering
Technology
The purpose of involving the United States federal
government in this space would be to ensure that owners of broad,
building block patents license these patents to other parties that
can work towards creating improvement patents.245 Based on the
239. See SCoPEx, supra note 1 (stating that one of the purposes of the SCoPEx
project is “to improve the fidelity of simulations (computer models)”).
240. See id. (“Analyzing these experiments will improve our knowledge
beyond what is currently available within computer models is measurable with
confidence under laboratory conditions.”).
241. See id. (explaining the benefit of inputting updated and real data into
computer modeling programs).
242. See Chavez, supra note 14, at 13 (“This is normally a cause of concern
because of the immense control patent holders have over future inventions.”).
243. See Parthasarathy, supra note 102, at 7–8 (discussing how the lack of a
robust research environment in the space of genetic tests led to less accurate and
most expensive methods for gene testing such as in the case for the BRCA genes).
244. See Reynolds, supra note 13, at 3 (stressing the global effect of climate
engineering technologies); see also Parthasarathy, supra note 100, at 10
(describing the high risks of geoengineering technologies).
245. See Chavez, supra note 14, at 14 (explaining how building blocks, while
not always possessing any marketable value on their own, can be crucial to
downstream development and the ability to create “incremental improvement
patents”).
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three mechanisms that the United States government may employ
when interfering in the patent system, it appears that creating a
specialized compulsory licensing scheme is most appropriate.246
The Bayh-Dole Act provides that the government can compel
patent rights holders that received federal funding to grant
licenses to the government to use their technology or to entities
which the government deems best to use to use the patented
technology.247 There is evidence that many CDR and SRM
technologies are invented with the aid of federal funding.248
However, march-in rights have never been exercised.249 And, the
specific requirements that must be met in order for the government
to exercise the march-in rights provision have been narrowly
construed making it even more difficult to satisfy these
requirements .250
Perhaps, the government could exercise march-in rights under
the Bayh-Dole Act’s third provision, which permits the government
to exercise march-in rights when it “is necessary to meet
requirements for public use by Federal regulations . . . .”251 But, as
of February 2020, there are no regulations defining what “public
use” would look like in this context.252 Further, even if “public use”
could be defined in this context, march-in rights would only be
applicable to inventions that used federal funding in their research
246. See supra Part II.D (describing the three mechanisms through which the
federal government can interfere with the patent system to license patented
inventions).
247. See Thomas, supra note 153, at 7 (explaining that the Bayh-Dole Act
preserves the United States’ ability to “march-in”).
248. See Oldham, supra note 101, at 7–8 (listing the U.S. National Science
Foundation, U.S. Department of Energy, and NASA among the entities that are
dominating climate engineering research funding).
249. See Thomas, supra note 153, at 1 (“Members of Congress have recently
taken note of the fact that march-in rights have never been exercised during the
35-year history of the Bayh-Dole Act.”).
250. See id. at 7–10 (stating the four scenarios where march-in rights can be
used and describing the six failed petitions to institute march-in rights).
251. 35 U.S.C. § 203(a).
252. See James Temple, Geoengineering is very controversial. How can you do
experiments? Harvard has some ideas., MIT TECH. REV. (July 29, 2019),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/614025/geoengineering-experimentharvard-creates-governance-committee-climate-change/ (highlighting that there
is not a US-government-funded research program in this area, or any public
oversight body set up to weigh the particularly complex questions surrounding
solar geoengineering) [perma.cc/P8Q9-WLT9].
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and development.253 Using march-in rights could allow private
entities to escape the possibility of mandatory licensing.254 Broad,
foundational patents invented without the use of federal funding
would still be able to take up large swaths of the geoengineering
field and prevent other inventors from building off of that
foundational patent to create incremental, “improvement”
patents.255
The government’s exercise of its eminent domain-like power
under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 would also be inadequate to fully address
the issues developing within the geoengineering patent space.256
Under Section 1498(a) of the U.S. Code, the federal government
has the ability to condemn any patent; however, the government
may only then allow the government or one of its contractors to
practice the invention.257 In the geoengineering space, the private
sector, without direct affiliation with the federal government, can
and should play a crucial role in the development of CDR and SRM
technologies.258 Limiting the potential licensees of this technology
to only the government and governmental contractors would not
solve the underlying issues within the geoengineering technology
space.
A specific compulsory licensing scheme, as was created with
the Atomic Energy and Clean Air Acts, would be the best option
253. See Thomas, supra note 153, at 7 (“The Bayh-Dole Act provides the
government with the ability to ‘march-in’ and grant licenses for patents that
resulted from publicly funded R&D.”).
254. See id. (stating that the Bayh-Dole Act only applies to inventions that
received some federal funding).
255. See Chavez, supra note 14, at 14 (explaining the implications of awarding
building-blocks early in an industry’s development).
256. See Thomas, supra note 153, at 8 (listing the similarities and differences
between march-in rights and 28 U.S.C. § 1498).
257. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (“[T]he use or manufacture of an invention
described in and covered by a patent of the United States by a contractor, a
subcontractor, or any person, firm, or corporation for the Government . . . shall be
construed as use or manufacture for the United States.”).
258. See Reynolds, supra note 13, at 2
Furthermore, the private sector arguably should play a role in solar
geoengineering research and any subsequent development and
possible implementation, as the private sector is the primary source of
valuable innovations in many devices, materials, techniques, and
services that might be necessary or useful for any development and
implementation of solar geoengineering.
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for addressing the concerns with SRM and CDR technologies.259
Like the Atomic Energy Act, a compulsory licensing scheme for
geoengineering technology could address concerns about the
national and international implications of this technology while
also promoting development within the industry.260 For countries
that have compulsory licensing provisions in other fields, the
benefits of having these provisions is not implementing the
scheme, but rather using the scheme as a threat.261 The threat of
implementing the compulsory licensing scheme can coerce patent
holders to grant licenses to third parties, and perhaps on terms
that may be more favorable to the patent holders than if the
compulsory licensing scheme were implemented.262
Additionally, there is evidence that the industry is already
taking steps on its own to fix the emerging technology issues.263 By
providing a clear mechanism through which patent holders
understand when they would be compelled to license their patents,
a specific compulsory licensing scheme could serve as further
encouragement to ensure that the industry develops in a manner
that does not lock up technologies.264
259. See 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (2018) (discussing the way that atomic energy can
“contribute to the general welfare”).
260. See Parthasarathy, supra note 102, at 9 (“It [Congress] created these
rules as part of the Atomic Energy Act in order to address concerns about national
security implications of atomic energy development while still promoting
development in this industry.”).
261. See Chavez, supra note 97, at 26 (describing the prevalence of
compulsory licensing schemes in international agreements and laws and that in
practice, countries rarely implement the schemes).
262. See id. (“More commonly, governments threaten to utilize their licenses,
thus coercing patent holders to either grant licenses or make the product
available at substantially lower prices.”).
263. See e.g., David Keith & John Dykema, Why We Chose Not to Patent Solar
Geoengineering
Technologies,
THE
KEITH
GRP.
(May
3,
2018),
https://keith.seas.harvard.edu/blog/why-we-chose-not-patent-solargeoengineering-technologies (advocating that inventors and organizations should
not patent SRM technology) [perma.cc/9MSS-LDCx]; see also Reynolds, supra
note 13, at 2 (“[W]e also found that there presently is a culture and practice among
solar geoengineering researchers of sharing data freely, and little evidence that
these researchers kept data or know how to themselves or took protective
measures to maintain trade secrecy in the data and know-how.”).
264. See Thomas, supra note 153, at 10–12 (describing the on-going debate
and uncertainty as to when march-in rights should be exercised); see also Chavez,
supra note 14, at 27 (“Compulsory licenses certainly could help address the
problems developing with geoengineering patents.”).
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B. Defining the Scope of a Geoengineering Compulsory Licensing
Scheme
While some authors advocate for the federal government to
compel licensing or exercise march-in rights to all green
technology, there are significant benefits to limiting the scope of
technologies susceptible to a compulsory licensing scheme to only
geoengineering technologies.265 Opponents of compulsory licensing
in general, highlight that compulsory licensing could deter and
stifle innovation.266 Therefore, limiting a compulsory licensing
scheme to only geoengineering technologies balances the concerns
of granting compulsory licensing generally with the concerns about
the unique, transnational, and high-risk nature of this technology.
Unlike atomic energy, there is a wide breadth of
geoengineering technologies with few common and easily definable
characteristics.267 Yet, the Atomic Energy Act’s definition of
technology susceptible to the act as, “to the extent that an
invention is useful in atomic energy” provides useful guidance.268
Patents and technologies subject to a potential compulsory scheme
should be limited to the extent that a technology is useful in
significantly altering the climate through climate engineering.269
Within CDR technologies, this would include ocean fertilization
and direct air capture; however, it would exclude the development
of more fuel-efficient car engines.270 Within SRM technologies, this
265. See e.g., Teneille R. Brown, The Eminence of Imminence and the Myopia
of Markets, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 674, 690–91 (2010) (advocating
for the use of compulsory licensing for all “clean tech”); see also Deborah Behles,
The New Race: Speeding Up Climate Change Innovation, 11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1,
26–31, 34–40 (2009) (discussing solutions to promote “green technology” including
creating a new patent system with compulsory licensing).
266. See Lauroesch, supra note 205, at 53 (“Similarly, opponents of
compulsory licensing argue that such licensing provisions would destroy the
research incentive that is so integral to the patent system.”).
267. See Parthasarathy, supra note 102, at 10 (contrasting geoengineering,
which “includes a wide range of technologies, from stratospheric sulfate aerosols
to mirrors to be built in space,” with atomic energy which was defined as
“fissionable material”).
268. See id. at 11 (“The precedent of patentability to the extent that an
invention is useful in atomic energy is therefore highly applicable to and useful
in [the] case of geoengineering.”).
269. See supra Part III.D. 3. Compulsory Licensing (discussing compulsory
licensing).
270. See supra Part IV.A. Determining Which U.S. Government Action Would
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would encompass grand schemes for cloud brightening but also
include the smaller inventions, such as the jet stream, necessary
to conduct and deploy large-scale SRM technologies. This
definition of technology susceptible to a potential licensing scheme
thereby defines the scope of the specialized compulsory licensing
scheme to encompass pertinent geoengineering technology
inventions, but also exclude tangentially related inventions that
are not crucial for geoengineering technology.
V. Conclusion
Climate change is one of the biggest problems of our
generation, and we may have passed the critical tipping point.
Geoengineering technology may be the only way to substantially
slow climate change and its effects. However, the current
development and granting of geoengineering patents raises
concerns about how the patent system has and will continue to
incentivize innovation. Creating a compulsory licensing scheme for
geoengineering technologies—technologies that are useful in
significantly altering the climate through climate engineering—is
a viable solution. Not only would this continue to encourage
licensing practices, but it would also reinforce the national and
international commitment to developing accurate technology built
upon robust research and innovative, collaborative thinking.

Best Promote Innovation Given the Unique Features of Geoengineering
Technology (discussing compulsory licensing with geoengineering).

